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INTRODUCTION

From an efficiency perspective, the overarching challenge in reforming the nation's health care system is finding the means to mitigate market failure. Market interactions in health care have been
distorted by the existence of imperfect and asymmetrically distributed
information, the peculiar incentives that flow from the presence of
insurance, and other market imperfections. While proponents of various legislative alternatives differ as to whether and at what social cost
efficient markets can be put in place, at the core of virtually all comprehensive reform measures is the creation of mechanisms to counteract these deficiencies.'
Competition-oriented reforms attempt to "manage competition"
by correcting market failures through a variety of means. Purchasing
alliances gather and process information that is at present too costly
for consumers and most employers to collect. Fixed benefit packages
avoid confusion and enable consumers to compare alternatives.
Along with community rating, fixed packages ameliorate the
problems associated with risk selection whereby individuals adjust insurance purchases according to medical need and insurers seek
favorable risks among their insured population through marketing
and other measures. In addition, requiring purchasing alliances to
pay plans according to the risk of the enrolled population reduces
2
incentives to select healthy subscribers and avoid the sick.
Anticipation of competitive reform has begun to radically
reshape the supply side of the industry. In recent months, the market
has undergone wholesale transformation manifested by increasing
vertical and horizontal integration of entities delivering health servt Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A., 1970 Wesleyan University;J.D., 1973 Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Steven Kramer for his comments
on an earlier draft of this article and to Chris Keefe for research assistance.
1 See ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGED COMPETITION IN
HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988); Alain C. Enthoven, Health Consumer-ChoicePlan (pt. 1), 298
NEw ENG.J. MED. 650 (1978);JohnJ. Inglehart, Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG.J. MED.

1208 (1993); Paul D. Wellstone & Ellen R. Shaffer, The American Health Security Act-A
Single-PayerProposa4 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1489 (1993).
2

See PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM 47-51 (1992).

1507
HeinOnline -- 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1507 1993-1994

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371723

1508

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1507

ices and by consolidation of insurance and delivery functions.3 Not
only have providers flocked to so-called managed care health planshealth maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and various hybrid entities-but integrated networks combining a full range of provider services and insurance in a
single organization also have proliferated. 4 Integrated delivery systems (IDSs), as the latter are known, range from loose contractual
affiliations to outright mergers of providers and insurers into a single
corporate entity. In general, two important characteristics distinguish
these arrangements. First, they possess some degree of functional integration of risk-based pricing, mechanisms for utilization review, and
quality assurance systems. Second, they may involve close collaboration among providers on competitively-sensitive issues such as global
pricing for services, allocation of markets among members, refusals to
deal with non-affiliated providers, and elimination of redundant or
excess capacity.
The configuration and competitiveness of integrated delivery systems are of critical importance to market-oriented reforms. These
networks essentially serve as the central nervous system of the managed competition model, transmitting incentives from consumers and
their purchasing alliances to providers while sending messages to the
marketplace in the form of prices that signal to consumers the value
(or resource costs) of health care services. Competitive reform theory
posits that integrated delivery systems will constitute the organizational framework for controlling health care costs, advancing that goal
in two ways. First, these systems will develop governance mechanisms
and incentive systems to control provider behavior. Second, competitive interaction among rival systems will ensure that systems do not
stray from the goal of cost containment.
Whether integrated delivery systems will realize these objectives
hinges on the development of a legal infrastructure that will support
3 In the nomenclature of the health care industry, the term "delivery" refers to the
furnishing of services by "providers," i.e., physicians, nurses, allied health professionals,
hospitals, outpatient facilities, laboratories, and vendors of durable medical equipment
(DME). Payment for these services is generally referred to as "reimbursement," a revealing

usage that betrays medical professionals' belief that compensation is an entitlement and
not a bargained-for exchange. See Clark C. Havighurst, The ChangingLocus ofDecision Mak-

ing in the Health Care Sector, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697 (1986).
4 See Frank Cerne, The FadingStand-Alone Hospital 68 Hosps. & HEAmTH NEroWRS,
June 20, 1994, at 28 (reporting results Deloitte & Touche-Hosps. & Health Networks survey
of 1743 hospitals and 43 health systems-67% of respondents' believed that having a PHO
is necessary for acute care hospitals; 20% indicated they have a PHO in operation; and
13% indicated they have a PHO that is not yet operational); Spencer Rich, U.S. Hospitals
Aren't Waiting For Congress, WAsH. PosT, June 21, 1994, at A4 (reporting results of an accounting firm survey finding 71% of hospitals either belong to or are in the process of
developing integrated delivery systems and 81% of hospital executives predict that their
hospitals will be parts of service networks within five years).
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competition. This Article analyzes two key determinants of the competitive consequences of integrated delivery systems: the design of
health care reform legislation and the antitrust principles applicable
to the composition and activities of these networks. It proposes that
in order to promote effective managed competition, both Congress
and the judiciary should decide health care issues with a keen appreciation of the peculiar nature of health care markets.
Part I discusses the economic characteristics of health care that
cause distortions in the market. It then assesses why "unmanaged"
competition has failed to control costs and has cast a shadow over
market-based reform strategies. Part II introduces the reader to several models of integrated delivery systems which are rapidly developing around the nation and appraises their capacity to help competitive
markets function properly. Part III analyzes the promise of managed
competition and describes certain flaws in various reform proposals
that may undermine the development of competitive networks. Part
IV traces the antitrust rules governing the formation and operation of
integrated delivery systems. It suggests some justifications for these
rules premised on the special economics of health care and urges that
the judiciary and Congress resist appeals to weaken their force.
I
WHY HEALTH MARKETS ARE DIFFERENT AND WHY
UNMANAGED COMPETITION HAS NOT WORKED

A.

Market Failure in Health Care

Health care markets diverge in a number of important respects
from the assumptions of neoclassical economics that define a perfectly
competitive market. The persistence of these sources of market failure helps explain why competition has failed thus far to contain expenditure growth or to efficiently allocate health care resources. 5
This section identifies the imperfections in health care markets and
traces their consequences.
For many years, providers dominated decisionmaking and institutional arrangements in the health care arena by successfully exploiting the special characteristics of health care delivery and insurance. 6
Later, as legal and other barriers to competition eroded, the imperfections of the health care market distorted incentives and economic outcomes so that the market was unable to perform its cost-economizing
5

See

ENTHOVEN,

supra note 1, at 12-13; The Jackson Hole Group, The 21st Century

American Health System or Managed Competition: A Proposal for Public and Private
Health Care Reform, Policy Doc #2, 1-2 (1991).
6

See

PAUL STARR,

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

(1982);

Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in American Health CareDelivery and
Insurance, 69 IowA L. REv. 1351 (1984).
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function. Strategies designed to improve competitiveness seemed to
have perverse results. In effect, the problem of "second best" may well
have thwarted well-intentioned reforms: by correcting some, but not
all, market imperfections, policymakers may have exacerbated condi7
tions and worsened the performance of the health care marketplace.
1. Information and Agency Problems
The prevalence of information gaps, asymmetric information,
and agency problems interferes with competitive interactions in the
health care marketplace." Given the technical nature of medical information, the complexity of diagnoses and treatment alternatives,
and the inherent uncertainty surrounding medical judgments, patients and third party-payers find it difficult to evaluate the cost and
quality of health services. To make matters worse, the information
that is available is distributed asymmetrically among providers, patients, and payers. To some extent, this may permit physicians to "induce demand" for their services; at a minimum this phenomenon
makes information costly for buyers to acquire.9
Closely related to the problem of asymmetric information are the
difficulties presented by agency relationships in health care. Uninformed patients delegate authority to physicians to make appropriate
decisions on their behalf. 10 However, because of the heterogeneous
nature of health care services and the demands of patients, physicians
7 For example, by reducing barriers to entry and increasing the supply of physicians
without correcting information problems and dealing with moral hazard in insurance, reg-

ulators may have increased the amount of unnecessary or marginally beneficial care being
supplied. See Jonathan E. Fielding & Thomas Rice, Can Managed Competition Solve the
Problems of Market Failure?,HEALTH Arr. 216 (1993 Supp.); see generallyR.G. Lipset & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theoy of the Second Bes 24 Rzv. OF ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); see infra
Part I.B.
8 See generally SHERMAN FoLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH & HEALTH CARE

151-74 (1993); Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical CareDifferent?, in COMPETITION INTHE HEALTH
CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 19, 28-30 (Warren Greenburg ed., 1978); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,53 AM. ECON. Rav. 941
(1963).
9 Financial incentives that reward practitioners who prescribe treatments of little
marginal benefit compared to cost may foster excessive utilization of services. The extent
to which induced demand is prevalent in the market is contested in the health economics
literature. See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 76-109 (3d ed. 1988). For a
discussion of information problems in health insurance markets and marketplace responses, see Thomas L. Greaney &Jody L. Sindelar, Physician-SponsoredJoint Ventures: An

Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 528-31, 540-42
(1987).
10 Quality evaluations are especially difficult because they usually cannot be performed ex ante. Some economic goods, such as health care services, that cannot be evaluated by observation or use (i.e., the consumer may never know if a treatment was actually
necessary) are referred to as "credence goods." Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Interven-

ing in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal andEconomic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REv.630, 658-59 n.69 (1979).
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cannot always act as appropriate surrogates. Moreover, there is often
a divergence of interest because the physician-agent may have financial incentives that conflict with his role as agent."
2.

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Information deficiencies compound other problems created by
the existence of health insurance. Insurance reduces policyholders'
vigilance about costs. This phenomenon, known as "moral hazard,"
implies that insured individuals will be more likely to seek care and to
demand more expensive services than they would if they had to bear
the full costs of these services. Moral hazard distorts markets, causes
an inefficient allocation of resources, and in the extreme case, can
destroy the marketability of insurance. 12 Insurers' ability to adopt
strategies for controlling moral hazard is constrained by the lack of
adequate information available to the insurer about the amount of
care really needed by a particular patient. Moreover, the incentives of
all parties to reduce moral hazard are limited by tax policies that sub3
sidize the purchase of insurance.'
Adverse selection occurs when policyholders are able to anticipate health care needs more accurately than insurers and then act on
that knowledge by adjusting their insurance purchases. This may result in excessive congregation of "bad risks" in certain plans.' 4 The
other side of the coin, "preferred risk selection," entails efforts by insurers to attract "good risks" through marketing, benefit design, and
other strategies. Successful exploitation of this phenomenon results
in some insurers' garnering healthy patients while their rivals are left
with a higher-cost population base. This generates a cycle of selection
that can segment the market.
3.

Heterogeneity of Services

Another significant difference between conditions in the health
care market and perfect market conditions is the fact that health care
services are highly heterogeneous. Quality may vary considerably, depending upon such things as the professional's talents, training, attentiveness, and "caring" attitude. Other factors such as geographic
location and variation in outcomes distinguish providers of health
care services. Product differentiation may significantly affect the level
of market power possessed by particular competitors and may en11

See FoLLAND E" Al-, supra note 8, at 162-74.
12 See id at 270-75; THOMAS G. McGuiPE, FINANCING PSYCHOTHERAF.
AND PUBUC Pouicy 51-60 (1988).

13

cTs

See MichaelJ. Graetz, Universal Health Coverage Without an Employer Mandate, DOMES-

TiC Arr., Winter 1993-94, at 79.

14

CosTs, E

McGuiRE, supra note 12, at 44-51.
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hance the risks of anticompetitive conduct in relatively unconcentrated markets. 15
4.

Mobility Barriers, NaturalMonopoly, and Cartelization

In contrast to perfect market assumptions that barriers to entry
do not exist, sellers of health services are subject to impediments to
mobility in the form of governmental and private licensing and prac16
tice requirements.
Perfectly competitive markets have large numbers of buyers and
sellers and are free of cartels or other private agreements to curtail
competition. The health care market, by contrast, has a long history
of private "self regulation" 17 and government-sponsored arrangements that restrict free competition. Moreover, many rural markets
cannot support multiple hospitals or numerous specialists. It may be
the case in such markets that only one integrated network can viably
8
and efficiently offer services.'
5.

"FreeRiders" and Fragmentation

Another important shortcoming of the health care financing and
delivery system is that it relies on highly fragmented provider "networks" 19 which do not command the loyalty of individual practitioners
and inadequately compensate innovations in cost control. Economists
have pointed out the transaction cost and public good consequences
of this phenomenon. For example, in a market in which each physician belonged to ten PPOs or independent practice association
(IPAs), the doctors each would have to assume the transaction costs of
dealing with ten different utilization controls and reimbursement
plans. Moreover, health plans would have little incentive to innovate
in cost control because each would have to share with other plans the
15 See Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of
Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. Ray. 1625, 1630-35 (1987); Louis Kaplow, The Accuracy of
TraditionalMarket PowerAnalysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternativ 95 HARv. L.REv. 1817,
1828 (1982); Richard Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARv. L. Ray. 1789,
1800 (1982) ("There is no general, universally applicable model of the competitive relationship among differentiated products.").
16
See 1 BARRY R. FuRRow Er Aj-, HEALTH LAw §§ 1-4 to 1-22, 3-2 to 3-21 (1994).
17 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 6; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 9, at 531-38; The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE LJ. 937
(1954).
18 See infa Part Ill.
19 As used in this Article, the term "provider networks" refers to affiliations of doctors
and-or hospitals that are not otherwise linked by an organizational structure. "Health
plans" are entities supplying a provider network and a health insurance component. On
the various kinds of integrated delivery systems, see infra Part II.
HeinOnline -- 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 1993-1994
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benefits realized from persuading physicians to adopt more efficient
20
practice patterns.
B.

The Legacy of Market Failure: Explaining the Failure of
Unmanaged Competition to Control Costs

Critics of market-based reform frequently point to the private sector's abysmal failure to contain costs during the "competitive revolution" of the 1980s as proof of the futility of reliance on competition.
However, close examination of insurance practices and provider responses to the incentives of the health financing system reveals a marketplace highly responsive to economic stimuli. Unfortunately, those
stimuli were the distorted signals influenced by regulation and the
market imperfections discussed above, and, consequently, competition often produced perverse results.2 ' Many practices ostensibly
designed to adjust to competitive imperatives in fact reflected successful exploitation of market imperfections. For example, insurers became quite adept at attracting healthier patients and avoiding risksefforts which contributed to market distortions and diverted energies
from other cost-lowering strategies. 22 Risk selection enabled the insurance industry to make profits by directing efforts toward risk-improving strategies such as marketing, product differentiation, provider
selection, and other steps rather than by putting direct pressure on
providers to lower costs.
A related strategy among insurers has been product differentiation and market segmentation. Insurers have offered packages of
products with widely varying payment and benefit features, thereby
reducing consumers' ability to compare prices and segmenting the
population into different package submarkets. This diversion from
price competition has tended to reduce pressures to lower prices, or
as Alain Enthoven has characterized the phenomenon, to make the
23
demand curve for HMOs more inelastic.
For their part, providers became quite adept at shifting the impact of competition onto others. As powerful third party payers (principally the government, HMOs, and larger employers) requested (or
mandated) that hospitals and physicians accept lower payments, prov20 See Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform-The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEw ENG.J. MED. 148, 149 (1993) (citing ALAIN C.
ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACrCE OF MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE

(1988)).
21 For a description of the shortcomings of the market and the absence of the political and legal infrastructure necessary to support competition, see Thomas L. Greaney,
Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179 (1988).
22 See STARR, supra note 2, at 40-42.
23
Alain C. Enthoven, Why Managed Care has Failed to Contain Health Costs,
ArF., Fall, 1993, at 27, 37-40.
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iders skillfully redirected the burden of cost containment by effectively charging considerably higher prices to those buyers lacking the
clout or the initiative to obtain discounts. This practice has been euphemistically referred to as "cost-shifting." 24 Physicians also avoided
governmental efforts to control fees by increasing the aggregate volume of services provided in almost perfect synchronism with each
25
"freeze" fee level.

C.

Economic Analyses of Managed Care

There is widely-accepted evidence that associates managed care
with significant cost savings as compared to fee-for-service or traditional indemnity insurance. 2 6 However, an important lesson emerging from the nation's experience with unmanaged competition in
recent years is that not all managed care systems are alike. Different
organizational forms vary significantly in their capacity to control
costs. For example, empirical studies reveal that HMOs and IPAs
achieve appreciably greater cost reductions than PPOs and IPA pointof-service systems. 27 These differences are attributable to greater selectivity by network plans in choosing providers and the superior cost
effectiveness of not covering services received out-of-network (as opposed to imposing financial disincentives for such services). In addition, a large number of studies show significantly greater savings
attributable to staff-model and group-model HMOs than are realized

24 Costs, of course, have little to do with what is being shifted. Providers were engaging in classic economic price discrimination, charging net prices reflecting higher margins
to those with less elastic demand. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTIRUST

ECONOMICS 258-79 (1985).
25
See James B. Mitchell et al., The Medicare Physician Fee Freeze HEALTH AFF., Spring
1989, at 21.
26
See Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, The Potential Impact of Certain Forms of Managed Care on Health Care Expenditures (1992) [hereinafter CBO Memorandum] (estimating that universal adoption of staff or group model HMOs would
reduce national health expenditures by over 10%). See also Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do
FinancialIncentives Affect Physicians' ClinicalDecisions and the FinancialPerformance of Health
Maintenance Organizations,321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989); W. Pete Welch et al., Toward
New Typologiesfor HMOs, 68 MILBANK Q. 221 (1990); David C. Stapleton, New Evidence on
Savings from Network Models of Managed Care, Lewin-VHI, Inc. Report to the Healthcare
Leadership Council (May 5, 1994) [hereinafter Lewin-VHI Report]. Some analysts contend that the magnitude of savings from managed care would be even greater than the
level currently achieved by efficient plans if system reform included adequate incentives to
choose cost-effective plans. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, UniversalHealth Insurance
Through Incentives Reform, 265 JAMA 2532 (1991).
27
Lewin-VHI Report, supra note 26 (reporting that network managed care systems
save 23% over fee for service plans while point of sale plans save only 13% and preferred
provider organizations save 11%). This study is particularly significant because it rigorously controls for differences in risk selection, benefit design and differences in markets.
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through other forms of managed care.28 The evidence regarding the
effectiveness of competitive contracting in states such as California has
led many economists to conclude that selective contracting is a key
29
element in making competition work.
Economic studies finding important differences in cost savings
among plans of a given type shed further light on the variables affecting competitive performance.3 0 These studies reveal significantly
greater savings associated with higher patient volumes of network
providers. In addition, markets where overall market penetration and
competitiveness of HMOs is greatest foster increased cost effectiveness. 3 1 Thus, where participating physicians treat relatively few patients from an IPA network, the IPA realizes lower cost savings than do
32
plans in which the physicians treat larger numbers of plan members.
A second important finding with respect to variations among plans of
the same type is that savings are greatest where price competition is
most intense.3 3 A number of other studies report significantly greater
provider discounts in markets with greater managed care competition.3 4 Finally, there is some indication that managed care has slowed
increases in physician compensation. 35 With notably slower growth in
specialty areas, this suggests that managed care can rationalize physician reimbursement and the manpower market.
28
See CBO Memorandum, supra note 26 (summarizing studies); Sheldon Greenfield
et al., Variationsin Resource Utilizationamong Medical Specialtiesand Systems of Care: Resultsfrom
the Medical Outcomes Study, 267 JAMA 1624 (1992).
29
E.g., David Dramove et al., Is Hospital Competition Wasteful?, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 247
(1992). See generally Paul A Paulter & Michael Vita, HospitalMarket Structure, HospitalCompetition and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 117, 166 (1994).
30 Lewin-VHI Report, supranote 26, at 5 (reporting variations among Aetna IPA plans
as high as 35% in one market area and as low as 12% in another. Variations in savings for
POS plans ranged from 1% to 24%; and savings for PPO plans ranged from 1% to 20%).
31 Id. at 30-41.
32 Id. at 6, 30-34 (reporting differences in cost savings based on the number of patients an IPA physician has; increases in volume from 100 to 1000 patients correlates with
the decline of 6.4% in costs).
33 Id. at 28 (explaining variations in savings among plans of the same type to the
magnitude of HMO penetration, market "maturity" as a managed care market and intensity of competition among HMOs). See generallyPaulter & Vita, supra note 29 (summarizing
studies).
34 See, e.g., David Dranove et al., Price and Concentration in HospitalMarkets: The Switch
from PatientDriven to Payer-Driven Competition, 36 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1993); Glen A. Melnick
et al., The Effects of Market Structure and BargainingPosition on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH
ECON. 217 (1992); Monica Noether, Competition Among Hospitals, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 259
(1988).
35 Morley M. Robbins & Richard C. Loudermilk, Lining Up Their Shots, HosPs. &
HEALm NETwoRs, May 20, 1994, at 30 (reporting results of a physician compensation
survey showing that managed care has caused leveling of physician compensation since
1992 with decreases in compensation for certain procedure-based specialties, decreases or
moderated growth in compensation for hospital-based physicians, and increased demand
for primary care physicians).
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II
A

TAXONOMY OF INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Anticipation of health care reform has generated extensive reorganization and innovation in the delivery of health care services in the
last year. Horizontal integration-combinations of providers competing at the same level of care-increased significantly. For example,
physicians have formed group practices, HMOs, "clinics without
walls," and other arrangements that entail varying degrees of clinical
and administrative integration. Hospitals have likewise combined in
increasing numbers by merging with other hospitals and by forming
joint ventures and informal alliances for sharing management and
jointly purchasing, operating, or owning facilities and equipment.
The most revolutionary development, however, has been the explosive
growth of vertical integration producing new entities offering hospital, physician, and ancillary health care services and furnishing management and information support services to providers. Increasingly,
vertical integration has gone beyond combining providers' services to
combinations that link an HMO or other insurance plan to the service
delivery functions.
Integrated delivery systems promote efficiency in several ways. Of
particular importance to managed care contracting, they facilitate
pooling of capital, spread financial risk, realize economies of scale,
and align the interests of physicians and hospitals. Integration also
fosters a "seamless" system that enhances quality by providing a comprehensive continuum of care from prevention through treatment
and follow-up.3 6
Although something of a protean concept, the integrated delivery system may be broadly defined as an organization furnishing to
insureds multiple levels of health services from affiliated providers
and furnishing to providers insurance, case management, contracting,
information services, or some combination of these.5 7 The following
taxonomy of integrated delivery systems describes the principal organizational features and integrative benefits of several models. It
should be noted, however, that there is considerable diversity among
systems within each model and that many hybrid forms exist in this
rapidly-evolving area.
36
F. Kenneth Ackermann, III, The Movement toward Vertically IntegratedRegional Systems,
17 HEALTH CARE MGT. REv. 81 (1992).
37 Carl H. Hitchner et al., IntegratedDelivery Systems: A Survey of OrganizationalModels,
29 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 273, 274 (1994); INTEGRATED HE.TH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS MANUAL (Allan Fine ed., 1993). See generally Kenneth L. Levine, The Tax Status of Vertically Integratedhealth CareDelivery Systems, 26J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 257 (1993); 20 ToPIcS IN HEALTH
CARE FRNANCING: INTEGRATED DELrvERY SYSTEMS (Paul R. DeMuro ed., Spring, 1994).
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Primordial Integration: Contractual Affiliations and Provider
Networks

Physicians have established a wide variety of commercial linkages,
including group practices,2 8 Independent Practice Associations
(IPAs) 9 Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), "clinics without
walls" (CWWs), 40 and group and staff model HMOs. 4 1 These organizations may in turn affiliate with hospitals, usually by contract, to offer
care. Alternatively, they may each separately affiliate with a third
party, such as an insurance company or employer to offer services to
enrollees of a health plan. Hospitals have likewise established networks such as PPOs, other managed care entities or "alliances," or
joint ventures that enable them tojointly contract for the provision of
services.
A distinguishing feature of IPAs, PPOs and CWWs is that they
entail relatively little functional integration among providers in terms
of practice management or patient care. This is especially the case
when reimbursement for services is on a fee-for-service basis.4 2 The
entity supplies some administrative services, principally joint marketing and some form of utilization review, but physicians maintain their
individual practices. Consequently, management of care is limited.
Greater integration results from capitated payment and certain other
forms of risk sharing because physicians must adopt practice styles
that control costs, obtain data to set capitation rates, and share with
each other services that promote effective cost control. 43 However,
the assets of providers remain separate, and there is little vertical inte38 Group practices are physician-controlled entities, usually partnerships or professional corporations, that operate as a single business entity, with common facilities, joint
ownership of assets, and the sharing of profits, losses, and expenses. Some physician
groups combine multiple specialties, while others consist exclusively of doctors in the same
field of practice.
39
IPAs are entities that contract with physicians to provide services to enrollees of
managed care organizations such as PPOs and HMOs. Physicians maintain their own practices and are reimbursed by the managed care organizations on either a fee-for-service or
risk-sharing basis such as capitated payments. Hitchner et al., supra note 37, at 275 n.4.
40 The clinic without walls (or "group practice without walls") is an organization
formed either through contract or establishment of a separate legal entity by sole practitioners or physician groups. The physicians or groups typically practice at multiple sites
and retain ownership of practice assets. Depending upon the amount of integration desired, the entity may operate a central office to provide marketing, billing, or other services
for the physicians. See FuRRow Er Al., supra note 16, § 5-49; Levine, supra note 37, at 269
n.4.; James G. Wiehl, Benefits and Detriments of Various Structural Models, in ITEGRAEr
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS MANUAL 1 410 (Alan Fine ed., 1993).
41
HMOs are discussed infra Part II.C.
42
Douglas Hastings, Developing IntegratedDelivery Systems: An Era of Change in Health
Delivery and Financing,inH.ALTH LAw HANDBOOK (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1994); Hitchner et

al., supra note 37, at 277.
43

Hitchner et al., supra note 37, at 281.
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gration among hospitals, physician practices, and the financing
system.
B.

Intermediate Forms of Integrated Delivery: Management
Services Organizations (MSOs), Physician-Hospital
Organizations (PHOs), and Foundation-Model
Systems

A number of recent organizational innovations have sought to
increase integration between physicians and hospitals to accommodate the demands of managed care contracting. These arrangements
vary considerably in the degree of integration, the functions that are
integrated, the magnitude and extent of financial risk sharing, and
the allocation of governance authority. Many regard these arrangements as an intermediate step toward more comprehensive integration. In other words, they are useful primarily for helping to
overcome resistance and hostility among physicians toward cooperative agreements that may entail sacrificing clinical and economic
autonomy.
1. Management Services Organizations
Management services organizations (MSOs) are entities formed
to provide management services and other assistance to affiliated physicians, group practices, clinics without walls, or other physician
groups. Although they lack significant patient care and financial integration, these arrangements generally entail stronger linkages between physicians and hospitals than the forms discussed in the
previous section. The typical MSO agreement involves either an acquisition of or contract to manage physician practices by an entity not
controlled by physicians, usually a hospital or hospital-physician joint
venture. MSOs perform a variety of functions for physicians including
billing and collection, personnel management, and group purchasing. In addition, they supply administrative and information services
necessary for managed care contracting, such as utilization review,
management information systems, facility design, and negotiation
services. 44 Hospitals participating in MSOs are able to obtain closer
ties and affiliations with primary care physicians thereby assuring an
adequate referral base for hospital services.
Many view the MSO as a transitional vehicle that assists hospitals
and physicians in taking the initial steps necessary to participate in
managed care contracting. However, as noted above, MSOs involve
no risk-sharing and little financial or functional integration among
44 Typically, MSOs are hospital subsidiaries, separate corporations, or joint ventures
in which hospitals and physicians share ownership. See generally FuRRow 'r Al.., supra note
16, § 5-49; Hitchner et al., supra note 37, at 285-86.
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participating physicians. Physicians surrender little in the way of autonomy. Overall, the principal integrative benefit of MSOs is their
capacity to lower the transactions cost of risk-based contracting.
2.

Physician-HospitalOrganizations

Physician-hospital organizations (PHOs) link hospitals, physician
groups, and sometimes other provider entities to form a network capable of contracting with third party payers to provide a comprehensive package of services. Although such physician-hospital ventures
may be established by contract, PHOs are typically separate legal entities controlled by governing boards consisting of both physician and
hospital representatives. 45 When formed by contractual agreement,
the provider network operates through a single agent empowered to
represent all providers in managed care contract negotiations. Sometimes the agent has legal capacity to bind the providers under a power
46
of attorney.
Although the PHO may bring together a large number of geographically-dispersed providers, it entails only partial integration because physicians and hospitals continue to function separately. PHOs
do not establish hierarchical organizational structures. 47 In essence,
the PHO operates as a negotiating agent on behalf of hospitals and
physicians. Consequently, PHOs may enter into capitated contracts in
their own name and establish financially integrated arrangements
among participating hospitals and physicians. As with MSOs, however, the appeal of PHOs lies in their potential to reduce the transaction costs of securing agreements and to offer a package of quality
and utilization controls that govern both medical and hospital services. The PHO model of organization also entails relatively little
clinical integration among participants because providers continue to
operate independently.
3. Foundation-ModelSystems
Under the "foundation-model" IDS, a nonprofit foundation (usually a hospital subsidiary or an affiliate of a hospital through a com45

While physicians or physician entities may or may not have an ownership interest in

the PHO, as a practical matter, significant physician input into the affairs of the PHO is

usually necessary. Commonly relied upon means for assuring physician input include
board membership and bylaw provisions requiring physician approvals for specified transactions. However, impasses may arise from certain structural arrangements, such as when

governance boards have equal representation from physicians and the hospital. SeeJames
G. Wiehl, Advantages/Disadvantagesof Integration Structural Models, in INTEGRATED HEALTH
CARE DELVERY SYSTEMS MANuAL, supra note 40, at 11-16.
46 Hitchner et al., supra note 37, at 296.
47 Because the PHO does not invest in physicians' tangible assets, it requires a rela-

tively small capital investment compared to other forms of integration. Id. at 296-97.
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mon parent) establishes one or more clinics to offer all primary and
specialty physician services and contracts with payers or consumers. It
also employs or contracts with physicians and other professionals to
provide services and owns and operates all aspects of the medical pracrices. In some cases, the foundation may own or be affiliated with its
own HMO. In these situations it is comparable to the fully integrated
delivery systems discussed in the next section that combine financing
and delivery.
The advantages of the foundation-model IDS lie in its extensive
coordination and integration of provider services and in its ability to
help physicians obtain access to capital while also enabling them to
retain autonomy over patient care matters. 48 In contrast to the MSO,
the foundation-model system usually owns or operates one or more
hospitals and outpatient clinics as well as the equipment, practice locations, medical records, and supplies of the medical practices of its
affiliated physicians. Thus, there is considerably greater integration of
the participating hospitals with the foundation-operated clinics.
Where employment of physicians is permitted, the foundation model
entails more comprehensive control over physician practices and
hence greater integration of clinical activities.
C.

Full Integration

The fully integrated system is one that combines comprehensive,
integrated service delivery with the insurance function. Prototypical
examples are those HMOs that own their own hospitals for the provision of acute care services and either employ staff physicians (staff
model HMOs) or contract with group practice physicians (group
model HMOs).49 These arrangements are fully integrated in several

respects. First, individuals must obtain all covered health services
from the HMO; any services received from non-HMO providers are
paid for by the consumer out-of-pocket. Thus, patients are closely
bound to the HMO for their care. Second, physicians are employees
or are paid through capitated payments and other financial arrangements that serve to align their incentives with those of the HMO. Finally, internalization of the insurance function within the entity
enables the HMO to design and market to employers and individuals
a single and complete package that integrates all provider and insurance services. In sum, the combination of functions and the align48 For example, foundations supply a variety of support and other services, such as
fund raising, administrative, informational, and negotiation services that link the functions
of its provider affiliates.
49 See Hitchner et al., supra note 37, at 302-03. On the structure of HMOs and the
legal issues affecting their operation, see FuRRow Er AL., supra note 16, § 11-11; see generally
Welch et al., supra note 26.
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ment of consumer and provider interests is most complete in this kind
of organization. Nevertheless, other integrated systems that combine
delivery and insurance functions (such as a foundation operating an
HMO) may approximate this form of integration, depending upon
how closely they tie providers' allegiances to those of the integrated
system.
III
REFORM PLAN DESIGN

Given the potential of integrated health plans to alleviate flaws in
the health reimbursement system and their central role under the
managed competition model, one would expect that the architects of
health care reform proposals would seek to capitalize on that potential. Instead, many reform bills (including those purporting to rely
most heavily on market-based reforms) contain features that are incompatible with effective competition among IDSs, and all neglect
bold changes that would strengthen the prospects for development of
efficient systems.
A.

Demographic Constraints on the Managed Competition
Model

A critical problem brushed aside by many advocates of marketbased reform of the health care system is whether a sufficient number
of efficiently-sized provider networks will develop to support effective
competition in a given market. Demographic evidence suggests that a
significant proportion of local health care service markets lack the
population base to support the minimum number of IDSs necessary
for inter-plan rivalry. In antitrust terms, the concern is that the demographic features of many parts of the country dictate that only oligopolistic provider networks will emerge. Consequently, tacit or explicit
collusion that will undermine the cost-containment benefits of competition is likely in these markets. Moreover, in a number of sparsely
populated areas, it may not be feasible to divide the hospitals and physicians into more than one efficiently-sized network. These markets
have natural monopoly characteristics which require regulation of
rates, allocation of resources, or other forms of governmental
intervention.
The basis for these concerns is illustrated by an important study
by Richard Kronick, David Goodman, and John Wennberg.50 In order to estimate the minimum population required to support managed competition, the Kronick-Goodman-Wennberg study examined
the staffing patterns at several large staff-model HMOs. Calculating
50

Kronick et al., supra note 20.
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the number of enrollees served by primary care and specialty physicians and by acute care hospitals, the study estimated the population
base necessary to support the various configurations of managed care
organizations. Assuming, rather optimistically,5 1 that at least three independent health plans are necessary to avoid oligopolistic interdependence and support effective competition, the Kronick-GoodmanWennberg study makes the following findings:
* A population base of 1.2 million individuals is required to support
three "classic HMOs" offering referral hospital services and using
their own staff physicians. Forty-two percent
of the nation's popu52
lation lives in market areas of this sort.

A population of 360,000 could support three plans providing
most primary care and most acute care hospital services, but
would need to share hospital facilities and contract for tertiary
services. Sixty-three percent of the population lives in markets of
53
this sort.
" A population of 180,000 could support three plans providing primary care and many basic specialty services, but the plans would
have to share certain specialty services such as cardiology and
urology. Seventy-one percent
of the U.S. population lives in
54
health markets of this sort.
" A population of 30,000 would support three independent primary
care networks but the plans would have to share all hospital services and hospital facilities. No estimate of the percentage of the
population living in this market was provided. 5 5
"

The Kronick-Goodman-Wennberg study is not as damning to the
entire concept of managed competition as it may first appear. The
underlying assumption that an efficiently-sized plan would mirror the
"classic HMO" may prove unrealistic as evolving systems develop new
methods for delivering services and allocating responsibilities among
providers. Moreover, the study does not account for rapid changes in
the market for specialized services; declining fee levels coupled with a
surplus in manpower may alter the feasible mix of services available in
sparsely populated markets. Finally, the study itself suggests that with
only moderate sharing of personnel and facilities (primarily those relating to inpatient services) a significant portion (seventy-one percent) of the population could expect to find themselves in
51 Concentration thresholds used in merger analysis identify serious competitive concerns when the number of equally-sized firms falls below five or six. See U.S. Department of
Justice-Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines § 1.5 (1992) (mergers in markets
with post-merger Herfindahl Index above 1800 regarded as highly concentrated, burden
on defendant to show that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive).
52
Kronick et al., supra note 20, at 150-51.
53
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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-competitive markets. 5 6 In addition, markets with far smaller populations (30,000) could support workable competitive systems at the pri57
mary care level.

B.

Implications for Health Reform

The Kronick-Goodman-Wennberg study has important implications for the regulation of competition and the configuration of plans
under health reform legislation. 58 As the authors point out, the data
highlights the need to structure competition in a manner that encourages development of efficient and competitive plans. 59 In addition,
the results argue for flexibility to permit development of alternative
models of regulation for dealing with demographic limitations on the
viability of competitive rivalry. In some instances, government interventions in the form of promoting cooperation, allocating resources,
or regulating rates may be an appropriate response to natural monopoly market conditions.
The study also points out some glaring inadequacies in the configuration of most reform proposals before Congress. The attenuated
competitive rivalry resulting from the dearth of plans in many markets
is exacerbated by the exemption of large sectors of the population
from full participation in competitive markets. Under all major reform proposals, Medicare beneficiaries, veterans, and others will continue to participate in financing plans that rely in large part on
administered pricing (e.g., fee-for-service reimbursement under a fee
schedule for physician services and prospective payments based on diagnostic related groups for hospitals under Medicare). This exemption of a significant portion of the population, perhaps as much as
twenty percent,60 effectively removes a critically important base for developing a competitive number of health plans.
In addition, reliance on administered pricing for a significant
portion of the population may slow the reconfiguration of delivery
because large segments of the provider community will continue to
take price and utilization signals from regulatory agencies. Incentives
for physicians to join integrated systems or for those systems to invest
in cost-containment or abstain from marginal investments will be
Id. at 150.
Id
58 Implications for antitrust policy are discussed infra Part IV.B.3.
59 Kronick et al., supra note 20, at 150-52.
60 The following table, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, tabulates the
number of individuals insured under different forms of insurance, grouped by the cost
control effectiveness of each form. Individuals in Medicare and other public programs
("other public" in the table) will continue to obtain insurance from public programs that
have little, if any, managed care.
56

57
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weakened if a significant part of their patient base is driven by inconsistently administered pricing.
A similar problem exists with respect to other aspects of reform
proposals that deflect segments of the population from the competitive market. For example, the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act requires that all health alliances contract with at least one feefor-service plan and that reimbursement for these plans be set
through collective negotiations between physicians and health alliances. 6 1 This inducement to fee-for-service plans may artificially inflate the demand for such plans and will reduce the population base
available to managed care plans.
Another perverse twist is found in proposed legislation that
would require managed care plans to accept all providers willing to
abide by the plans' terms and standards. 6 2 Forced reimbursement of
non-network providers dilutes the effectiveness of the network concept by diminishing the rewards to selective contracting; likewise, it
weakens incentives to join competitive plans and sever ties with feeALLOCATION OF POTENIAL RECIPIENTS OF PERSONAL HEALTH SERVICES, BY
PRIMARY SOURCE OF INSURANCE FUNDING AND LEVEL OF EFFaCrIVENESS OF
MANAGED CARE ARRANGEMENTS,

Primary Source of
Insurance Funding

Total

All Sources
Medicare
Medicaid
Private or other public
No insurance

259.6
32.1
15.4
176.9
35.2

1990 (In millions)

Level of Effectiveness of
Managed Care Arrangemene
I
II
III
IV
16.7
1.3
0.3
15.2
0

65.5
0
0
65.5
0

119.4
30.8
1.3
87.3
0

57.9
0
13.9
8.8
35.2

SOuRCE: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on data from the Social
Security Administration's Office of the Actuary, the March 1990 supplement to
the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, and the Health Care Financing
Administration.
Managed care categories are defined as follows:
I. Staff- and group-model HMOs;
II. Effective utilization review incorporating precertification and concurrent
review of hospital care;
III. Other forms of managed care;
IV. No managed care.
CBO Memorandum, supra note 26, at 10.
61 Health Security Act of 1993, S. 1757, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. § 1402 [hereinafter
HSA].
62 Some bills would mandate that insurers or other plans include "any willing provider" as participating providers in their systems. See N.Y HMO FearsAny Willing Provider
Law, 27 PULSE 9 (July 29, 1994) (describing opposition to any willing provider provision in
House Ways and Means Committee health reform bill). Others such as the Health Security
Act would require that low-cost sharing HMOs and other plans offer reimbursement to
.out of network" providers whether or not the provider contracts with the network. HSA
§ 1402.
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for-service practice.63 Despite the obvious inconsistency with the theory and structure of managed competition reforms, these provisions
have found a surprisingly receptive audience in state and federal
legislatures.
IV
POLICING MARKETS AND PROVIDER CoNDucT AFrER REFORM:
THE ROLE OF ANTrRUST LAw

Antitrust has served as the nurse midwife to competition-based
health care reform. Litigation has removed professional barriers to
65
discounting, competitive contracting,6 4 and affiliation with HMOs;
stopped dozens of private boycotts aimed at innovative financing
plans;6 6 and discouraged provider collectives from engaging in collusive bidding.67 Antitrust law will almost certainly play an equally pivotal role in the post-reform era because the success of managed
competition hinges upon assuring the competitiveness of provider
networks and health plans. Despite the intense scrutiny applied by
federal enforcement agencies and the courts in this area, some doctrinal underbrush remains in antitrust law that may impede smooth application of procompetitive policies to the institutional arrangements
developing in anticipation of reform.
63 The Federal Trade Commission has advised several states not to adopt "any wiling
provider" legislation because it contends that bans on exclusive or preferential contracting
deny the means of insuring providers a substantial portion of the plan's business. "Without
that volume, a would-be contracting provider may be unable to achieve economies of scale
and offer lower price terms or additional services." Letter from Michael 0. Wise, Acting
Director, Office of Competition Policy, Federal Trade Commission, to Honorable E. Scott
Garrett (March 29, 1993). See also Terese Hudson, State Laws: A Stumbling Blockfor Systems
Integration?,Hosps. & H.ALTH NETwopus, April 20, 1994, at 40 (reporting perception of
insurance industry that any willing provider laws increase costs and impair growth of integrated systems). The Health Security Act proposed to preempt all state laws that would
compel health plans to contract with "any willing provider." HSA § 1407.
64 American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd as modfied, 638 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), aff'd, by an equally divided court 452 U.S. 676 (1982). See generallyFuRRow ET AL.,
supra note 16, §§ 10-27 to 10-29.
65 See, e.g., Medical Serv. Corp. of Spokane County, 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976) (consent
decree order prohibiting concerted action to deny participation in Blue Shield plan to
doctors who worked for an HMO). See generally FuRRow ET Al., supra note 16, §§ 10-10 to
10-29.
66 The Federal Trade Commission has successfully challenged the activities of the
medical staffs of Florida hospitals that conspired to prevent competition from the Cleveland Clinic, a multi-specialty group practice charging innovative "unit prices" for packages
of health services in lieu of the conventional method of separate billing. Broward Gen.
Medical Ctr., No. C-3344 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 1991) (consent order); Holy Cross Hosp., No. C3345 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 1991) (consent order).
67 United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983). See FuRRow Er AL., supra note 16, §§ 10-27
to 10-30.
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Antitrust analysis examines the effects on competition of two
types ofjoint activity: horizontal combinations and vertical combinations. Regarding horizontal combinations, there are several concerns.
First, providers may form loose affiliations under the banner of creating a new health plan when, in fact, they contemplate little more than
collusive bidding. Second, provider membership in these plans may
entail unwarranted levels of concentration or exclusionary effects so
as to imperil competition. That is, health plans may become so few in
number that they will either exercise unilateral power over health care
distribution or coordinate their policies to raise prices or otherwise
restrict consumer choice. If provider-controlled networks garner
enough market power to become entrenched oligopolistic networks,
they can effectively insulate providers from competitive pressure, thus
reducing rivalry among health plans and undermining the promise of
managed competition.
Vertical harms are more indirect and, according to some economists, more imagined than real. 68 In any event, the focus of concern
about vertical combinations-both collaborations and mergers-is
that the aggregation of formidable players in the insurance, physician
services, and hospital services markets will foreclose competition from
other networks. This could occur through acquisitions, exclusive contracting with providers, and other arrangements that raise rivals' costs,
or tactics that raise barriers to entry. Such strategies could subvert the
promise of vigorous, inter-plan rivalry. Yet, because vertical integration promises significant cost savings and efficient health care delivery, it is necessary to make at least a rough determination of whether
these benefits offset anticompetitive risks.
Indeed, integrated delivery systems raise issues that span the entire field of antitrust causes of action. It is not unrealistic to imagine a
dominant IDS that presents problems involving monopoly, monopoly
leveraging, price fixing, market allocation, boycott, tying, exclusive
dealing, and anticompetitive mergers. This Article does not attempt
to track all the possible theories under which an IDS may be subject to
antitrust scrutiny but instead offers some guideposts to help chart the
course of antitrust analysis over a shifting regulatory and economic
landscape. Specifically, it posits that enforcement must be attuned to

68 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, VerticalArrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTTRusT LJ. 135 (explaining that not all vertical restrictions should "be a subject of serious
antitrust attention"); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cn. L. Rv. 6 (1981). While significantly limiting antitrust
law's scrutiny of vertical restrictions, principally by expansion of the rule of reason and
constriction of the Sherman Act's conspiracy requirement, the courts have not gone so far

as to embrace a regime of per se legality. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
POLICy. Ti LAw OF COMPETION AND rrs PRAcTncE § 11.5-11.7 (1994).
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both market imperfections that pervade the health care industry and
69
to the dynamic regulatory environment reshaping that industry.
A.

Horizontal Restraints

The threshold question facing an integrated delivery system is
whether the provider network is a true efficiency-creating collaboration (i.e., a legitimate joint venture) or simply a cartel. The classic
horizontal joint venture entails pooling of resources and sharing of
risk among competitors with the goal of producing a product at less
cost than would otherwise be possible or one that otherwise might not
be offered at ally'0 The doctrinal consequence is that joint ventures
are examined under antitrust's "rule of reason" which determines legality by weighing potential procompetitive benefits against likely anticompetitive harms. Cartels, by contrast, are subject to summary
condemnation under the per se rule, which dispenses with inquiries
1
into competitive effects or purposes)
As is the case with many issues in antitrust, the answer to the question of whether an IDS is a legitimate joint venture turns on how one
characterizes certain aspects of its operations)' 2 First, one must determine whether the combination is "horizontal," i.e., controlled by competing providers or their agents (in contrast to "vertical" network
arrangements in which decisionmaking powers are vested with third
parties unlikely to simply do the bidding of the providers). Second,
one must determine whether the network is truly an "integration," i.e.,
a bona fide joint venture that produces efficiencies or enables the collaborators to market a new product. Although guidance on both
questions is readily available in the case law and the pronouncements
of the enforcement agencies, close examination of market and regula69 Despite the labyrinthine character of applying antitrust to integrated systems, it
would be folly to absolve providers from antitrust scrutiny or relax the standard against
which they are to be judged. Such actions would cause the benefits of managed competition to quickly unravel. Moreover, allegations of confusion and uncertainty in the marketplace appear vastly overstated in view of the countless policy statements, advisory opinions,
and litigation brought by the FTC and Justice Department over the past fifteen years. See
Thomas L. Greaney, When Politics and Law Collide: Why Health Care Reform Does Not Need
Antitrust "Reform", 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 1994);Janet D. Steiger, Chair, Federal
Trade Commission, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights, March 23, 1993.
70 See Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 H'.v. L. Rxv. 1521
(1982); Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 9.
71 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). On the changing nature of the
per se rule of reason modes of analysis, see PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AmITRUST LAw § 1105 (1993 Supp.).

72 See Chicago Professional Sports, Ltd., Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961
F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992) (noting the importance of the
process and cautioning that "characterization is a creative rather than exact endeavor").
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tory factors in health care markets brings into sharp focus the importance of the law's insistence on efficiency justifications to avoid
summary condemnation.
1.

Control

A number of cases have dealt with the degree of control necessary
to establish that a payment system is, in fact, a horizontal combination
of providers. Several decisions characterize as horizontal price-fixing
agreements plans whose governing boards are comprised of a majority
of provider representatives or whose decisionmaking structure permits providers to establish reimbursement rates. 73 Other decisions
suggest that the absence of formal power to elect a majority of members of the board, while not dispositive, will militate heavily against a
finding of conspiracy. 74 Although mere solicitation of input from
providers does not constitute the control necessary to establish liability,75 a number of courts have been willing to examine a variety of

76
other factors that may establish de facto control.
As noted earlier, integrated systems include a wide array of governance arrangements that require shared responsibility among providers. 77 For purposes of untangling whether "control" is retained by
the providers themselves, it is important to bear in mind the underlying economic interests of the parties involved in the arrangement.
Hospitals and providers share the common objectives of obtaining
maximum reimbursement and freedom from outside control. Driving
the parties together are the physician's need for capital and a network
73 See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denieA 493
U.S. 846 (1989) (finding conspiracy where physicians' controlled board of payment plan);

Addino v. Genesee Valley Medical Care, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. N.Y. 1984) (finding
price fixing where physicians controlled Blue Shield plan); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984) (arguing that control by competing hospitals
over Blue Cross reimbursement rates would establish an agreement to fix pricing and constitute unlawful price fixing); Saint Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 712 F.2d
978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984) (finding that control by competing
hospitals of Blue Cross association amounted to price fixing over fee schedule restricting
reimbursement to non member providers).
74 See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 258 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985) (finding no conspiracy where health care
providers did not constitute a majority of the board despite the fact that dentists dominated advisory committees which approved broad actions and whose "recommendations"
were consistently followed by the board).
75 See Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
76 SeeAddino v. Genesee Valley Medical Care Inc., 593 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 846 (1989) (physician board members, although not themselves directly competing
with podiatrists, shared similar economic interests with board members and physicians who
were direct competitors of podiatrists). See generally Gary M. Smith, Comment, Provider
Control ofHealth Insurers: Are Doctors Still Calling the Shots?, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1079 (1990).
77 See supra Part II.
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structure for contracting and the hospital's need for an adequate referral base for patient admissions. 78 Indeed, these factors are often
the focus of negotiations establishing PHOs, MSOs, and other integrated networks. Moreover, although the nature of the physician-hospital relationship has shifted somewhat from earlier models in which
physicians were able to dominate decisionmaking on most economic
variables, business dealings between these parties today require close
79
cooperation to guarantee joint maximization of profits.
It is therefore unrealistic to assume, for example, that physicians
participating in a hospital's PHO do not "control" the network simply
because they cannot elect a majority of the entity's board or because
they lack formal authority to set prices. Furthermore, granting board
membership to nominally independent third parties such as local
business interests, civic groups, or even academics should not automatically insulate these arrangements from characterization as a per
se illegal horizontal combination. Ultimately, antitrust tribunals need
to engage in a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of control and governance relationships of such associations in order to fix the true locus of authority within an integrated system. Where physicians or
hospitals in an integrated system retain authority over price-setting,
membership or other competitive factors, courts should not hesitate
to characterize the arrangement as a horizontal agreement even
though the provider group lacks structural control.
2.

Integration of ProviderActivities

As discussed above, the second key determinant of whether a provider network constitutes a cartel or joint venture is the nature and
extent of integration among the providers. As a general matter, joint
venture analysis assumes that the greater the integration, the more
likely the arrangement will produce efficiencies and seek primarily to
compete for business rather than cartelize the market. In Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society,8 0 the Supreme Court refined this requirement for provider-controlled payment plans by noting that the
physicians in that case could have avoided per se condemnation had
they shared risks or created a "new product," the twin hallmarks of
partnerships and other joint ventures that escape per se condemna78

See supra Part II. See also Frank Cerne, Capital Concerns, Hosps. & HEALTH NET-

April 20, 1994, at 14 (noting the "transition from viewing hospitals as a stand-alone
revenue generator to cost centers within integrated systems"); Dean C. Coddington et al.,
Costs and Benefits of IntegratedHealthcareSystems, 48 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 20 (1994).
79 See supraPart II. See alsoJames F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital
Peer Review, 51 L. & CoANTEMr. PROBs. 7 (1988).
80 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
WORKS,
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tion.8 x Besides informing the decision as to whether a cartel exists,

the nature and extent of integration in an IDS may also play a role in
analysis under the rule of reason. In other words, courts weighing
pro-competitive efficiencies must appraise the cost-savings realizable
from integration.

82

The cases8 3 and the Department of Justice-FTC Joint Policy Statements8 4 have interpreted Maricopa to require that there be meaningful functional integration, a significant degree of risk-sharing through
pooled capital, or other means for allotting risk of loss among providers controlling a network. For example, staff model HMOs in which
participants share risk through capitated reimbursement epitomize
thejoint venture by coordinating practices and realizing economies of
scale and scope.8 5 On the other hand, loose confederations of doctors that share little more than an administrative apparatus to package
bids to buyers are highly suspect.86 Between these polar extremes falls
the large, ambiguous middle ground of many collaborative arrangements among providers in the market today. As discussed in Part II

above, many MSOs and PHOs lack significant integration and do not
share the risks for many of their contracting arrangements. Conse81
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351 (finding facial invalidity for naked price fixing schemes,
as distinguished from ventures offering new products or "other joint arrangements in
which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks of
loss as well as the opportunities for profit"). See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) ("Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are.., not usually unlawful, at least not as price fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.").
82 U.S. Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission, Statements ofEnforcement
Policy and Analytical PinciplesRelating to Health Careand Antitrust 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13152, 20769 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Joint Policy Statements]. These Joint Policy
Statements, issued as this article was being finalized, revise and expand the agencies' previous statements, U.S. Department ofJustice-Federal Trade Commission, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13150, 20758
[hereinafter 1993 Statements].
83
See Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(holding that physician-controlled IPA was sufficiently integrated where members accepted capitated payment to cover all medical services to enrollees of HMO and in which
up to 15% of fees were withheld by the IPA as a "risk withhold" and only paid if the IPA's
level of expenses permitted payment).
84 Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at 20793-20794. See alsoJ. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks before the 33rd
Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Section (March 22, 1985);
Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks to Connecticut Health Lawyers Ass'n (March 11, 1988); MarkJ. Horoshak, Assistant
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks before the Washington State Hospital Ass'n (September 25, 1993).
85 Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351.
86 The Justice Department and FTC have challenged a number of "sham" PPOs as
price fixing agreements where provider networks were really thinly-disguised cartels. See
Southbank IPA., 57 Fed. Reg. 2913 (F.T.C. 1993) (consent order); Preferred Physicians,
Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988); U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release regarding Stanislaus Preferred Provider Organization (Oct. 12, 1983).
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quenfly, they risk characterization as price-fixing schemes and may
not be credited with significant efficiency-enhancing benefits under
the rule of reason.
Strong emphasis on the importance of providers sharing risks,
and in particular sharing the risk of over-utilization or high costs of
services, is entirely appropriate in health care markets.8 7 Despite criticisms from organized medicine 8 this standard is on sound footing
when one takes into account the peculiar market conditions of health
services delivery and insurance. Most important, risk sharing through
capitation deals effectively with moral hazard in insurance by forcing
providers to bear the financial consequences of overutilization. That
is, risk-based payment encourages providers to practice cost-effective
medicine and mitigates the perverse incentives of insurance and information inadequacy. In addition, providers assuming substantial risk
of the success or failure of an integrated network are more likely to
maximize efficiencies associated with integration.
Less complete integration in MSOs, PHOs, and provider-owned
plans such as PPOs arguably enhances efficiency by lowering certain
transaction costs through shared administrative expenses, joint negotiations, and utilization review. 89 However, these arrangements do not
effectively align the underlying incentives facing individual providers,
especially where providers are members of multiple plans. Indeed,
87 The Joint Policy Statements set forth the following test for physician networks qualify
for safe harbor treatment evaluating whether: they must either provide treatment at a
capitated (or per subscriber) rate or provide financial incentives to members to achieve
cost-containment goals, such as withholding compensation with distribution only if costcontainment goals are met. In contrast to previous pronouncements, however, the Joint
Policy Statements provide that "the agencies will consider other forms of integration that
amount to the sharing of substantial financial risk." Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at
20794. The agencies have been applying essentially this standard of integration in litigation for a number of years. See Southbank, IPA Inc., 57 Fed. Reg. 2913 (1992) (consent
order) (prohibiting respondents from dealing collectively with third party payers unless
they formed an "integrated joint venture," defined as collaborations involving pooling of
capital and sharing substantial risk of adverse financial loss if costs or use of health services
are unexpectedly high). See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
88
See Letter fromJoseph PainterJames S. Todd and Kirk B.Johnson, American Medical Association, to Janet D. Steiger, Chair, Federal Trade Commission (petition for advisory opinion) (Apr. 20, 1992);James S. Todd, Physicians as Professionals,Not Pawns, HEALTH
AFF., Fall 1993, at 145, 146.
89 There must, of course, also be some link between the collective agreement to set
prices and the efficiency tools of the plan. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 352 (noting that it is
not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing when other means are available to obtain
transactions cost savings). The enforcement agencies have not been entirely clear on this
point. Compare Mark J. Horoschak, Assistant Director, FTC Bureau of Competition, Remarks Before the National Council of Community Hospitals (November 13, 1992) ("simply
no logical connection between a price agreement and many of the activities that PPOs...
engage in... [W]hile these activities may produce real, cognizable efficiencies... they do
notjustify a horizontal price agreement.") with Charles F. Rule, Remarks Before Connecticut Bar Ass'n, supranote 84 (deeming transaction cost and other savings sufficient integration to justify price agreements in provider-sponsored PPOs).
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the "free rider" and fragmentation problems associated with cost containment where individual health plans do not command participating physicians' loyalty and cannot capture the benefits of innovations
in cost containment 90 are exacerbated where there is no meaningful
sharing of risks. Individual physicians simply have little reason to toe
the line when reimbursement is not closely tied to their individual
efforts to control costs.
Many integrated delivery systems will likely involve providers sharing substantial risk through capitation and will not be characterized as
price fixing schemes. Such systems must then pass muster under the
rule of reason which seeks to determine the net competitive effects of
the collaboration. One ingredient in the mix, of course, is the existence of procompetitive efficiencies that lower the cost of medical
care. The Agencies' Joint Policy Statements single out cost savings associated with the assumption of financial risk by the participating physicians "as meriting particular attention." 91 However, the foregoing
considerations counsel that antitrust tribunals should avoid the impulse to assume that the existence of some integrative activity produces
substantial procompetitive effects that offset the risks associated with
concentration and product differentiation discussed in the following
section. For example, free rider problems limit the usefulness of risksharing in certain integrated systems. That is, because risks are shared
across the entire panel, individual physicians in an IPA suffer relatively
insignificant financial consequences from particular treatment decisions for each patient. Depending on the reimbursement arrangements with the IPA,the physician may actually profit by making costly
decisions. In any event, the penalty of the shared risk may not overcome physicians' ingrained habits of accommodating patients' de92
mands for costly levels of care.

90

See supra Part I.
Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82.
92 Dennis A. Yao, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks before the Los Angeles
County Bar Ass'n, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50100 at 4886 [hereinafter Yao
Remarks]. A sound application of these principles is found in a recent FTC staff advisory
opinion concluding that a PPO in which physicians would collectively set prices did not
constitute an agreement ancillary to partial integration among participating physicians.
Although 15% of fees for each physician were to be withheld in a "risk pool," the fact that
payments were to be made at the 88th percentile and that approximately 50% of all physicians in the state would be participating suggested that participants would not have strong
financial incentives to adhere to cost-containment goals. Lacking sufficient incentives to
alter "each physician's normal incentive to maximize his or her income by increasing the
number of services provided to enrolled patients," the staff concluded that the risk withhold would not be a sufficient form of risk sharing. Letter from MarkJ. Horoschak, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, to Paul W. McVay (July
5, 1994).
91
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Assessing Risks to Competition
a. Market Structure and Competitiveness

Assuming a plan is sufficiently integrated to avoid per se illegality,
the method of analysis shifts to examining the net competitive consequences under the rule of reason. A pivotal issue under this inquiry is
the extent of the plan's market power. 93 In brief, the question becomes: how many providers may a provider-controlled network have?
The antitrust enforcement agencies have delivered a number of pronouncements on this issue, the most recent being the Joint Policy
Statements. 94 These statements suggest that a physician-controlled
network would fall within a "safety zone" if it accounted for less than
twenty percent of the physicians in a relevant market where the physicians contract on an "exclusive" basis. 95 For non-exclusive networks,
the threshold for the safety zone is thirty percent. 96 The Joint Policy
Statements go on to note that each specialty might constitute a separate relevant market for purposes of calculating the percentages, but
allow that in rural areas where there would be fewer than five physicians in many specialties, a more flexible standard would apply. For
physician networks falling outside the safety zone, an open-ended balancing under the rule of reason would presumably weigh efficiencies
and risks based on market power. 97 The Joint Policy Statements view
plans with exclusive arrangements with providers as more likely to
raise competitive concerns because they leave less opportunity for formation of rival plans to dissipate the market power of the incumbents.
Federal advisory opinions have been inconsistent in this area,
occasionally displaying inexplicable leniency by approving provider93 Some courts and commentators have argued that the absence of market power
should preclude a finding of liability under the rule of reason. See Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting in part) ("Liability in antitrust law almost always requires proof of market power. This is because market power is an
essential ingredient of injury to consumers. Market power means the ability to injure consumers by curtailing output and raising price... no market power no violation."); Thomas
M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of HoriontalArrangments: Agreements
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANrrusT L.J. 579, 602-03
(1993). But see Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993) (rejecting "safe harbor" approach based on market
power alone).
94 Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at 20787-20788; see generally Thomas L.
Greaney, TheDepartment offustice/FTC Health Care Policy Statements: A Critique,11 ANunrrTs
20 (1994) (questioning the need for original policy statements and criticizing certain ambiguities and misstatements concerning applicable antitrust doctrines).
95 The Policy Statements define an "exclusive" network joint venture as one which
"significantly restricts the ability of its members to affiliate with other physician network
joint ventures and to contract individuality was health benefit plans." JointPolicy Statements,
supranote 82, at 20787.
96

Id.

97

Id. at 20788.
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controlled networks with high shares of providers in their relevant
markets. 98 The Policy Statements and speeches of governmental enforcement officials have generated additional uncertainty. In particular, federal antitrust authorities have failed to articulate clearly the
sources of market power in plans and have not given useful guidance
on how those risks might be evaluated and weighed against offsetting
benefits. As discussed below, a clearer delineation of competitive risks
and a greater appreciation of the health market context is needed.
Overinclusive provider networks threaten competition in two
ways. First, they may reduce competition in the market for provider
services by, for example, lessening price or quality rivalry among physicians or hospitals that contract with insurers health plans or employers to deliver services. Second, they may impair competition in the
financing-insurance market by reducing the feasible number of viable
plans and hence increase the risk of oligopolistic behavior or segmentation. The probability and magnitude of these potential effects must
be considered in light of the imperfections in health care financing
and delivery markets.
The risk to competition in the provider services market from
overinclusive networks is twofold. First, these networks have the potential power to unilaterally raise providers' prices due to their large
share of providers or differentiation in the quality, service, or location
of those providers. Second, provider networks able to coordinate
their actions may exercise oligopoly power, consequently raising
prices for the providers' services. Somewhat surprisingly, government
agencies have often downplayed the risk of oligopolistic coordination
and stressed the potential harms from a unilateral exercise of power. 99
However, as we have seen, the demographics of many local health
care markets already make precarious the prospects of effective competition because of the limited number of providers available in those
areas. Permitting overinclusive provider membership in networks will
only exacerbate oligopolistic market structures for provider services
and drive up prices for those services throughout the market. Hence,
98 Compare Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice Business Review Letter to Frank
Sanchez (October 3, 1986) (Department ofJustice announcing it does not plan to challenge PPO controlled by pharmacies constituting 30 to 50 percent of local markets) with
letter from M. Elizabeth Gee, Assistant Director, FrC Bureau of Competition, to Michael
E. Duncheon (March 17, 1986) (declining to approve provider-sponsored PPO based on
providers' control over price terms).
99 See, e.g., Charles Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Remarks Before National Health Lawyers Association (March 11, 1988) ("primary
anticompetitive threat of a PPO is that ... it may be implemented to prevent the formation
of competing alternative delivery systems" by signing up "all or most providers in a market"). See also Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at 20789 (identifying as "key areas of
competitive concern" whether a network joint venture can raise price above competitive
levels or prevent formation of other ventures).
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absent compelling evidence of scale economies, enforcement agencies and the courts should resist efforts of the provider community to
stretch the twenty and thirty percent thresholds when examining networks under the rule of reason. 10 0 In addition, it should be observed
that as the proportion of competing providers in networks increases,
differentiation among networks also increases. While this may lessen
to some extent the risks that providers will collude, economic analysis
also suggests that this differentiation can cause prices to increase
where integration is not complete.' 0 '
Provider concentration may also affect competition at the insurance or health plan level. Excessive membership of any competitively
significant provider group on an exclusive basis will restrict the
number of competing plans and hence worsen the oligopoly problem
demonstrated in the Kronick-Goodman-Wennberg study. 10 2 That is,
these markets will be deprived of effective competition because there
will be too few rivalrous IDSs. Moreover, without exclusivity, widespread cross-membership in plans would enhance opportunities for
coordination between plans as information, strategies, and cost-saving
protocols are unlikely to remain secret. In sum, a central goal of antitrust policy must be to prevent development of overinclusive provider
networks that will further reduce the number of viable competing
plans or undermine their competitiveness. Hence, close attention
should be paid to maintaining market structures that minimize risks
10 3
of oligopolistic coordination.
b.

Evaluating the Effects of Exclusivity

One particularly vexing question in applying conventional concentration tests to provider-controlled networks has been the treatment afforded to exclusive contracts such as a commitment by a group
of physicians to join only one integrated network. The original Joint
Policy Statements released in 1993 generally regarded exclusive arrangements between plans and providers negatively but stopped short
100 See, e.g., Letter from Anne Y. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't ofJustice to John R.Cummins, Esq. (October 28, 1994) (business review
letter approving physician-controlled, nonexclusive network comprised of 37 percent of all
physicians in service area and of percentages "significantly higher" than 30 percent in
some specialties).
101 Gregory Vistnes, Multi-Firm Systems, Strategic Alliances and Provider Integration
(1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Cornell Law Review).
102 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
103
SeeJames F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks to National Health Lawyers Ass'n (February 15, 1991) (rejecting prior safe
•harbors announced by Antitrust Division personnel and proposing that networks be analyzed under principles enunciated in Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines);Jint Policy
Statements, supra note 82, at 20789 (identifying competitive issues as including whether a
physician network could raise prices above competitive levels and whether there were
"many other" actual or potential physician networks).
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of condemning such arrangements. 10 4 The revised Joint Policy Statements adopt a more tolerant view, announcing a new safety zone for
exclusive physician network joint ventures and recognizing the potential for procompetitive effects in multiprovider networks. 10 5 The concept of exclusivity is not confined to formal contractual commitments.
Factfinders need to determine whether market conditions or contractual arrangements create such strong disincentives to contract with
other networks that providers are implicitly bound to only one
network. 106
Distrust of exclusivity is undoubtedly warranted in markets with a
small number of rival networks and in which tying up a large proportion of the area's physicians in a few competitively crucial specialties
can foreclose others from forming rival plans. 10 7 On the other hand,
exclusive arrangements have great potential for promoting loyalty and
commitment among affiliated providers and ensuring that physicians
see enough subscribers to make it likely they will engage in cost-effective practices.' 0 8 These arrangements also help networks prevent opportunistic behavior and may reduce a variety of transaction costs. 10 9
As discussed in Part I, economic analysis suggests that proliferating
affiliations between managed care groups and physicians has attenuated loyalties and enabled providers to pursue a limited discounting
strategy in their negotiations with managed care organizations." 0
Thus, a market with five competing networks, each contracting exclusively with twenty percent of the market's physicians, is likely to realize
greater price competition and innovation than one in which each of
five plans had contracts with all the doctors in the market. In sum,
See 1993 Statements, supra note 82, at 20765.
Joint Polity Statements, supra note 82, at 20787-89 & 20796.
See id. at 20796 (listing practical indicia to determine whether a network is truly
non-exclusive such as the extent of participation in other networks, past departicipation,
and the presence of viable alternatives). See also Letter from MarkJ. Horoschak, Assistant
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, to J. Bert Morgan, Esq.
(Nov. 13, 1993) (FTC staff advisory opinion cautioning that tacit agreement by radiologists
in PPO not to join other panels or payor programs would support findings of market
power where high percentage of radiologists in market belonged to PPO).
107
See, e.g., Ohio v. Greater Cleveland Hosp. Ass'n, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65685
(N.D. Ohio 1983) (consent decree) (prohibiting association of 90 percent of hospitals
from forming insurance plan that prohibited members from contracting with other plans
except on equally favorable terms); U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Press Release Regarding Stanislaus Preferred Provider Organization (Oct. 12, 1983) (announcing voluntary dissolution of
provider-controlled PPO consisting of between 50 and 90 percent of area providers contracting exclusively with challenged plan).
108 See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
109
SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44-45 (1984) (citing
advantage from tied sale of hospital and anesthesiology services, including 24-hour coverage, standardization of procedures, efficient use of equipment, flexibility in scheduling
and improved monitoring of quality of services). See also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
110 See supra notes 19-20, 26-35 and accompanying text.
104
105
106
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exclusivity arrangements are a double-edged sword. Courts and enforcement authorities would be well-served by establishing guidelines
as to the threshold at which exclusivity may change from a factor that
promotes competition to one that retards it.
c. Delimiting the Market in Which JDSs Compete
The agencies skirt one other difficult issue posed by market imperfections. Their Joint Policy Statements acknowledge that market
definition must investigate "what substitutes, as a practical matter, are
reasonably available to consumers for the services in question.""'
This at best obliquely recognizes that market definition should be sensitive to product differentiation and information gaps that may afford
one plan or network the ability to raise prices or reduce quality without worrying about certain other plans perceived to be of lower quality or too remote geographically.
Though the dynamic nature of health insurance may complicate
the inquiry, product market definition is likely to be of critical importance in competitive analyses because of the diversity of insurance
products being developed. A particularly insightful decision by Judge
Boudin in US Healthcare,Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc."12 usefully analyzes
this issue. While upholding a lower court finding that the proper relevant market consisted of all health care financing, the court acknowledged that a separate HMO market could exist, assuming differences
between HMOs and other financing systems were proved. The court
properly framed the issue as whether a sole supplier of HMO services
could profitably raise prices over cost and suggested that facts such as
usage patterns, customer surveys, specific features of the plans, and
113
profit levels would assist the factfinder in answering the question.
B. Vertical Issues and Integrated Delivery
On its face, vertical integration-the linking of hospitals, insurers, and physicians to create integrated systems-would seem to produce unmitigated competitive benefits. Vertical combinations,
whether by contract or merger, can achieve efficiencies by reducing
transaction costs, facilitating the pooling of capital, reducing uncerJoint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at 20795.
986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
113 Id. at 597. Even this complex factual investigation does not fully resolve the issue of
which entities should be included in a properly defined product market. The finder of
fact must also investigate the possibility of a "supply response," i.e., whether other firms,
not currently selling in the product market would be likely to become a market participant
within a short period of time in response to the exercise of market power. These "uncommitted entrants" may be treated as competitors in the product market where they do not
have to incur significant sunk costs of entry and exit. See Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.32 (April 2, 1992).
111

112
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tainty, and spreading risk. 1 4 In practical terms, vertical combination
eases many of the administrative, information, and cost problems associated with assembling contracts for managed care contracting. Moreover, in contrast to horizontal integration, there is no direct
enhancement of market power because market shares of individual
providers are not aggregated. Potential harms from vertical integration-principally raising entry barriers for competitors and foreclosing markets or access to inputs, that other plans need to competemay not always lessen competition despite the fact they injure rivals.
Consequently, antitrust treats vertical restrictions tolerantly by applying the rule of reason to all non-price restraints and permitting vertical mergers of large firms except in the most extreme circumstances.
Nevertheless, a growing economic literature has emphasized the
potential harm to competition resulting from exclusionary practices
that raise rivals' costs through vertical arrangements."15 A firm that
can successfully bid up the price of inputs or otherwise increase its
competitors' costs can under certain conditions create or enhance its
market power. For example, an IDS might acquire or contract exclusively with several strategically-important medical practices or prominent multi-specialty groups and consequently disadvantage rivals so
that it can reap supracompetitive profits despite paying a premium to
bid away the specialty practice.
A variety of antitrust claims are likely to grow out of vertical integration among providers and insurers. These potential claims span
the universe of antitrust causes of action but for the most part center
around several basic issues: exclusion of providers from networks, exclusive contracting, and foreclosure of competing integrated systems.
The following sections discuss the application of antitrust doctrine to
this area from the perspective of market imperfections and regulatory
change.
1. Exclusion of Providersfrom IntegratedDelivery Systems
Integrated systems involve selective contracting between providers and some part of the system. For example, a PHO may choose to
admit only certain members of the hospital staff and an IPA network
might affiliate with a specific hospital or radiology service. Increasingly, plans are likely to engage in "economic credentialing" and to
expel practitioners whose utilization patterns are unacceptably high
E. WILLIAMSON, MARE AND Hi(1975).
115 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). See infra notes 136-38 and
accompanying text.
114

See

HOVENKAMP,

supra note 68, at 329-49;

OLIVER

ERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
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or who fail to meet other performance standards. 116 Excluded providers are likely to cry foul, claiming that their exclusion constitutes a
restraint of trade, monopolization, or attempted monopolization.
Antitrust tribunals are well-schooled in dealing with these
claims. 117 They have rejected a number of actions brought by excluded providers alleging illegal boycotts by provider-controlled plans
that denied them participating provider status; 118 anticompetitive exclusive dealing between plans and selected medical groups or hospitals that foreclosed their opportunities to compete; 119 and
monopolization by large insurers who refused to include the providers
or who insisted on onerous terms. 120 Although each of the various
antitrust rubrics under which exclusion may be challenged has its own
conditions and proof requirements,' 2 1 they all share a common requirement that procompetitivejustifications underlie the exclusionary
conduct. A brief review of the economic underpinnings of selective
contracting suggests that such justifications should be readily available
in cases alleging anticompetitive exclusion in the future.
It has frequently been observed that exclusion of providers is essential to the efficient functioning of managed care systems. 12 2 As
116
"Economic credentialing" refers to the use of criteria relating to a provider's costeffectiveness in using medical resources in determining whether to extend hospital staff
privileges or establish other relationships with the provider. See John D. Blum, Economic
Credentialing: A New Twist in HospitalAppraisalProcesses, 12 J. LEG. MED. 427 (1991).
117
The pattern of unsuccessful suits involving exclusion payment systems mirrors the
courts' experience in dealing with hundreds of cases involving denials of hospital staff
privileges to physicians and allied health professionals. See FuRRow Er AL., supra note 16,
§ 10-16 (noting that only a handful of the large number of suits have been successful but
nonmeritorious litigation continues). Hopefully, this long history of unsuccessful litigation will have a deterrent effect on opportunistic suits claiming anticompetitive exclusion
from payment systems.
118 Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679, 694 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(finding exclusion of allergists who violated plan's cost containment protocols "justified by
enhancing [economic] efficiency and making the market more competitive"). But see
Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846
(1989) (exclusion of entire class of practitioners violated Sherman Act where no plausible
justification proffered).
119 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d. 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
120
Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Mich., 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984). Where an exclusion does not result from an agreement between the plan and another party or is not the action of a provider-controlled
plan, courts have found no violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act because there is no plurality of actors. Section 2 claims (monopolization or attempted monopolization claims) have
likewise been dismissed as a matter of law because a plan cannot monopolize a market in
which it is not a competitor, and because the need to impose standards on providers constitutes a reasonable business justification for exclusion. See Glen Eden, 740 F.2d at 423;

Hassan, 698 F. Supp. at 679. See also 2 JoHN J. MiLES, HFALTH CARE & ANurrrusT LAw

§ 15.05 (1991).
121
Healthsource,986 F.2d at 592.
122
See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 84.
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one analyst succinctly put it, selectivity in contracting enables plans "to
control their costs and their reputations." 123 It acts as a spur to price
competition because providers vie for participating provider status by
lowering prices and practicing cost-effective, high quality medicine in
return for the promise of more patients.
The imperfect market conditions of health care financing lead to
other observations. Selective contracting is economically significant
because it provides insurers with the means to fight moral hazard and
provider-induced demand; providers risk losing access to patients if
they fail to adhere to utilization protocols. In addition, where providers are organized to share risk through capitation, the power to exclude or expel is essential to the economic integration of the joint
venture. Finally, selectivity confronts directly the two antitrust
problems associated with assembling panels for integrated systems:
overinclusiveness and fragmentation. That is, it provides the mechanism by which a plan can limit its panel to an efficient size but stop
short of excesses that threaten to produce oligopolistic market structures. At the same time, it promotes the sorting-out process by which
physicians ally themselves with a single or limited number of plans to
avoid the fragmented loyalties and other problems associated with
multiple plan membership. Thus, market failure considerations
which underscore the procompetitive benefits associated with membership restrictions in integrated networks may play a prominent role
124
in the balancing of competitive effects under the rule of reason.
2.

Exclusive Contractingand Related Terms in Provider Contracting

Integrated delivery systems are likely to engage in a number of
contracting practices with providers that may have adverse effects on
competition. For example, they may enter into exclusive contracts
that prohibit providers from contracting with another system or from
giving that system equally favorable terms.125 An IDS might also require that providers sign "most favored nations" commitments promising to give the IDS the same price concessions given to any other
system 12 6 or take other steps that weaken rival systems' ability to com123 PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMiCS 315 (3d ed. 1988). See alsoJ. Paul
McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks Before the 33rd Annual
American Bar Ass'n Antitrust Spring Meeting (March 22, 1985).
124
For a somewhat opaque account of the factors bearing on permissible exclusions
from joint ventures, see Joint Policy Statements, supra note 82, at 20797.
125
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
126
Ocean State Physicians' Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of RI., 883 F.2d
1101 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); United States and State of Ariz. v.
Delta Dental Plan of Ariz., Civ. No. 94-1793, 59 Fed. Reg. 47349 (Sept. 15, 1994) (consent
decree settling charges that defendant plan used "most favored nations" clauses in provider contracts to restrain competition with other plans). See generallyFuRuow Er AL., supra
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pete. 27 Rivals are likely to attack these undertakings as illegal conspiracies (typically exclusive dealing) under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, or as abuses of monopoly power (or attempts to monopolize)
under Section 2. Again, proof standards and requirements vary according to which antitrust theory is applied, but the principal underlying concern is that the plan may obtain or maintain market power
either by foreclosing such a high portion of providers that rival plans
enter the market or by raising the rivals' costs so that supracompetitive prices can be maintained.
Exclusive dealing claims involving health care providers have
been the subject of extensive antitrust litigation.128 Exclusive contracts between an IDS and providers generally violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act when they result in market foreclosures of substantial
proportions (greater than thirty percent) and when other proof exists
based on the nature, duration, and procompetitive benefits of the restriction that makes it likely that the arrangement will impair competition. 12 9 The ultimate concern with foreclosure is that so much of the
market will be tied up by the exclusive dealing arrangement that single firm dominance or oligopoly is more likely because actual and potential rivals will not be able to secure an adequate supply of services
to compete.' 3 0 If entry is unrestricted and practicable, however, foreclosure poses little risk.
The First Circuit's analysis of an exclusive dealing arrangement in
U.S. Healthcare,Inc. v. Healthsource,Inc.13 ' illustrates the application of
these principles to vertically integrated payment systems. The incumbent HMO in that case offered its physicians higher reimbursement if
they agreed not to participate in any other HMO. With respect to a
Section 1 claim filed by a rival HMO asserting foreclosure, the court
found plaintiff's proof inadequate to establish that the price differennote 16, § 10-39; Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of Most FavoredNations Clauses in
ContractsBetween Health CareProviders, 69 N.C. L. REv. 863 (1990).
127 See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1991) (payor's termination of participating hospital affiliated with
HMO coupled with threats to other hospitals and reduced hospital payments coerced hospitals and constituted willful maintenance of monopoly power). See generally FuRRoW Lr
A.., supra note 16, §§ 10-36 to 10-39.
128 On hospital contracts with hospital staff physicians see, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See generally FuRRow ET A.., supra note 16, § 10-24
(analyzing cases). On exclusive dealing between providers and payment systems, see U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993); FuRaow, supra, §§ 1035, 10-37.
129 See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594-96 (lst Cir. 1993);
Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks Before the Group Health Ass'n of America (February 28, 1989) (PPO or HMO controlling more than 35% of available providers and precluding them from dealing directly
or indirectly through "most favored nations" clauses would pose antitrust problems).
130 HOVENKAMP, supra note 68, § 10.6b2.
131 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
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tial granted to exclusive physicians "operated economically to restrict
doctors" and observed that plaintiff could offset any adverse effect by
only modest efforts.' 3 2 Further, in view of the duration of the exclusivity arrangement (initially 100 days, later shortened to thirty days),
the defendant was obliged to introduce facts proving the restraint was
not de minimis.133 Finally, the court questioned the quantitative significance of the foreclosure, noting that if only twenty-five percent of
the market's primary care physicians were under exclusive contracts, a
34
significant number presumably were "available" to plaintiff.
Confined as it was to the inadequacy of plaintiff's factual showing, U.S. Healthcaredoes not create a safe haven for exclusive dealing
arrangements involving integrated delivery systems. One caveat that
might be attached to Judge Boudin's approach to evaluating foreclosure is that close scrutiny of independent factors such as the magnitude of the financial incentive, the duration of the exclusivity, the
extent of foreclosure, and the parties' intent may unduly fragment the
inquiry. The ultimate questions should be whether the arrangement
on balance creates a compelling incentive for providers to remain
with the integrated system that offers exclusivity covenants and
whether, given those incentives, viable alternatives are unavailable to
other networks. Indeed, a number of economic factors suggest that
such arrangements may merit the close attention of the courts. First,
there are many local health care markets that are susceptible to foreclosure because of demographic factors limiting the number of viable
integrated systems.' 3 5 Second, there is ample grounding in the literature on strategic behavior to suggest that exclusive contracting may
have anticompetitive consequences in such markets. It is feasible, for
example, for an IDS (even one lacking significant market power) to
forestall entry when it can lock up enough physicians to raise rivals'
costs above minimum efficient scale.' 3 6 Under certain circumstances,
it may also succeed in assuring itself supracompetitive returns by these
tactics even when it raises costs through exclusive dealing arrange37
ments and even though entry is not entirely precluded.
As one thoughtful observer has pointed out, the benefits of incumbency may also create strategic advantages that enable exclusive
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 596.
'34 Id.
135 See supra Part III.
136 Eric Rasmussen et al., NakedExclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1137 (1991); Steven Salop
& David Shefman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 276 (1983).
137 The most plausible sceriarios would entail the IDS creating a "bottleneck" by obtaining exclusionary rights from the lowest cost providers or inducing collusion among the
providers by creating an industry structure likely to generate high prices. See Krattenmaker
& Salop, supra note 115, at 67.
132
13
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dealing arrangements to exacerbate potential barriers to entry. 13 8 It
should also be remembered that IDSs by their nature will usually entail wide geographic coverage and comprehensive service offerings.
Thus, to be successful, entry will have to occur on a large scale and
involve significant sunk costs. In these circumstances, a careful appraisal of the timeliness, likelihood, and effectiveness of new entry is
required, 3 9 and the exclusive contract's short duration will not be dis140
positive in determining the prospects for competitive foreclosure.
3.

Vertical Acquisitions

Antitrust issues may also arise from vertical mergers. For example, when a hospital forms a foundation-model IDS by acquiring physician practices and facilities that provide ancillary services, competitive
concerns about inter-system rivalry might arise. Antitrust doctrine is
somewhat unsettled in this area because the Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue in twenty-two years and because the enforcement
141
agencies have been less than clear about the principles they apply.
Although the last Supreme Court case to address the issue found that
a vertical merger violated the Clayton Act where the percentage of the
market foreclosed was only ten percent, 42 most analysts agree that
contemporary courts will require far larger market shares and look to
other factors as well. 143
138

Commissioner Dennis Yao of the Federal Trade Commission identified the risks

associated with exclusive dealing creating potential barriers to entry.
If all providers are already "signed up" with incumbent health care networks, it will be difficult to establish a rival network. A new entrant would

have to "bid" participating physicians away from exclusive deals with incumbents, and this could be very expensive. Individual physicians could take a
"you first" attitude, reluctant to sacrifice a beneficial exclusive deal unless a
sufficient number of other physicians have already signed up with a new
plan to make it viable. For this reason, a new entrant might have to pay a
significant premium to gain a critical mass of participating physicians.
Thus, by raising the costs to new entrants by exclusive dealing, incumbent
oligopolists might successfully maintain their market power.
Yao Remarks, supra note 92, at 4886.
139 Merger Guidelines, supra note 113, §§ 3.0-3.4.
140 I am indebted to Steven Kramer of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice for this observation.
141 The 1992 Merger Guidelines do not even discuss vertical mergers and the 1984
Merger Guidelines do not acknowledge foreclosure as a basis for challenging a merger.
After almost ten years without challenging a vertical merger, however, the Clinton Administration's Antitrust Division has brought three such cases, all involving the communications industry. See Access Requirement Resolves Division Concerns over AT&T/McCaw Merger,67
AN-rrrUsT TRADE REG. REP. 85 (July 21, 1994).
142 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1962).
143 See HovENAmp, supra note 68, § 9.4 (analyzing and discrediting most economic
theories upon which vertical mergers have been challenged). For recent judicial expressions of skepticism about potential harm from vertical mergers, see Alberta Gas Chems.
Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1059 (1988); Fruehauf Corp. v. F.T.C., 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Under the economic analysis applied by the Justice Department,
the primary concern with vertical mergers by integrated systems appears to be the risk of raising anticompetitive entry barriers. Vertical
mergers create objectionable entry barriers only where three conditions are satisfied. First, the vertical integration in the market must be
so extensive as to force entrants into the primary market to enter the
secondary market simultaneously. Second, entry at the secondary
level must make entry at the primary level more difficult. Finally, the
structure and other characteristics of the market must be conducive to
monopolization or collusion.1 4 4 The Justice Department's approach
may be criticized for paying exclusive attention to vertical mergers'
effects on entry barriers and for failing to establish concentration
thresholds at appropriate levels. Vertical mergers may cause harm to
established competitors by raising their costs significantly without increasing entry barriers. 145 In addition, the Guidelines' suggestion that
concerns about forced two-level entry will be obviated where the
unintegrated capacity in the market will support two firms of efficient
scale in the primary market is inconsistent with concentration thresholds generally relied upon for evaluating threats of oligopolistic
146
coordination.
An interesting, albeit perhaps extreme, example of the potential
for anticompetitive harms flowing from vertical integration is found in
the FTC's recent case involving the ownership by a number of
47
pulmonologists of partnerships providing home oxygen services.'
The Commission charged that the pulmonologists, who constituted
approximately sixty percent of the practicing pulmonologists in the
relevant markets, were able to obtain market power, create barriers to
entry, and restrain competition through the vertical linkage of their
provider services and oxygen delivery services. The effect of the vertical combination was especially strong in this case, as oxygen services
are almost always prescribed by pulmonologists. Moreover, given the
asymmetrical distribution of information between patient and provider, it is likely that the pulmonologists were able to influence their
patients' choice of supplier. Despite the strong overtones of information imperfections in this case, the Commission did not rely on these
facts to strike down all physician self-referrals. Instead, it agreed to a
consent order directed at the structural problems in the market, and
Department ofJustice, 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.21.
See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 115, at 284-85 (finding guidelines' oversight
significant "where entry barriers are already high so that rivals are dependent on established firms for their supplies of the input").
146
Id.
147
Home Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co., FTC File No. 901-0109 (Sept. 2, 1992);
Homecare Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co., FTC File No. 911-0020 (Nov. 17, 1993) (consent
order).
144
145
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required divestiture of ownership interests to reduce to twenty-five
percent or less the percentage of pulmonologists in each market owning a partnership interest in the venture.
Given the highly concentrated structure of many markets for delivery of health services and the likelihood that vertical integration will
result in only a few fully integrated systems, it is probable that many
acquisitions will meet the structural conditions specified in the Justice
Department Guidelines. In other words, the development of competing health plans will be made virtually impossible where one or two
IDSs have acquired most of the physicians' practices in an area or
(more plausibly) have acquired all the practices in several strategically
crucial specialty markets. As analyzed in the previous section, entry
barrier concerns warrant close attention in IDS markets and cannot
be lightly dismissed where scale economies and sunk costs are
148
significant.
CONCLUSION

If pooled consumer purchasing power is to control cost, a sufficient number of efficient and viable integrated delivery systems must
be competing to attract subscribers with low-cost, high quality medical
insurance and delivery. Conversely, if one or a few integrated networks dominate the market for physician or hospital services, rivalry
on the main issues of health care cost control will likely dissipate. A
central goal of health reform legislation, therefore, should be to establish a regulatory infrastructure that encourages the growth of rival
IDSs while also developing regulatory tools to deal with markets that
cannot achieve that goal.
Vigilant and sensible antitrust enforcement is the second prerequisite for nurturing the conception of managed competition discussed
in this Article. Despite the considerable emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust commentary and litigation in recent years, neither commentators nor judges have carefully explored the implications of
market failure for antitrust doctrine in health care cases. Market imperfections add significantly to the competitive risks posed by restraints of trade and other conduct policed by antitrust law.
Moreover, these conditions may diminish the likelihood that self-correcting market forces will ameliorate whatever dangers antitrust law
misses. Economic evidence suggesting that a large part of the country
can support only the bare minimum of efficiently-sized integrated systems adds to the challenge facing antitrust analyses.

148

See supra Part IV.B.2.
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